Werner Heisenberg

The physicist may be satisfied when he has the mathematical scheme and knows how to use for the interpretation of the experiments. But he has to speak about his results also to non-physicists who will not be satisfied unless some explanation is given in plain language. Even for the physicist the description in plain language will be the criterion of the degree of understanding that has been reached.

The existing scientific concepts cover always only a very limited part of reality, and the other part that has not yet been understood is infinite.

Any concepts or words which have been formed in the past through the interplay between the world and ourselves are not really sharply defined with respect to their meaning: that is to say, we do not know exactly how far they will help us in finding our way in the world. We often know that they can be applied to a wide range of inner or outer experience, but we practically never know precisely the limits of their applicability. This is true even of the simplest and most general concepts like "existence" and "space and time". Therefore, it will never be possible by pure reason to arrive at some absolute truth.

The concepts may, however, be sharply defined with regard to their connections. This is actually the fact when the concepts become part of a system of axioms and definitions which can be expressed consistently by a mathematical scheme. Such a group of connected concepts may be applicable to a wide field of experience and will help us to find our way in this field. But the limits of the applicability will in general not be known, at least not completely.

We have to remember that what we observe is not nature herself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning.

There is an enormous difference between modern science and Greek philosophy, and that is just the empiristic attitude... Since the time of Galileo and Newton, modern science has been based upon a detailed study of nature and upon the postulate that only such statements should be made, as have been verified or at least can be verified by experiment. The idea that one can single out some events from nature by an experiment... to find out what is the constant law in the continuous change, did not occur to the Greek philosophers. Therefore, modern science has from its beginning stood on a much more modest, but at the same time much firmer, basis than ancient philosophy. Therefore, the statements of modern physics are in some way meant much more seriously than the statements of Greek philosophy.

[E]ven in the most precise part of science, in mathematics, we cannot avoid using concepts that involve contradictions. ...[I]t is well known that the concept of infinity leads to contradictions... but it would be practically impossible to construct... mathematics without this concept.

Cautious deliberation based on purely rational arguments can save us from many errors and dangers. ...But ...there will always be a fundamental complementarity between deliberation and decision. ...The decision finally... pushing away all the arguments... The decision may be the result of deliberation, but it is... complementary... it excludes deliberation. Even the most important decisions... contain this inevitable element of irrationality. ...[I]t cannot be avoided that some real or apparent truth form the basis of life; and this fact should be acknowledged with regard to those groups... whose basis is different from our own.

[U]ncomprimising belief carries much more weight than some special philosophical notions... [T]he great majority... can scarcely have any well-founded judgement concerning the correctness of certain important general ideas or doctrines. ...[T]he word "belief" can for this majority not mean "perceiving the truth of something" but... only... as "taking this as the basis for life." ...[T]his second kind of belief is much firmer... much more fixed... it can persist even against immediate contradicting experience... not... shaken by added scientific knowledge... sometimes... to the point where it seems completely absurd, and ends... only with the death of the believer. Science and history can teach us that this... may become a great danger... [S]uch belief has always belonged to the great forces in human history.

I remember discussions with Bohr which went through many hours till very late at night and ended almost in despair; and when at the end of the discussion I went alone for a walk in the neighbouring park I repeated to myself again and again the question: Can nature possibly be so absurd as it seemed to us in these atomic experiments?

Whenever we proceed from the known into the unknown we may hope to understand, but we may have to learn at the same time a new meaning of the word "understanding."

[I]n the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory we can indeed proceed without mentioning ourselves as individuals, but we cannot disregard the fact that natural science is formed by men. Natural science does not simply describe and explain nature; it is part of the interplay between nature and ourselves; it describes nature as exposed to our nature of questioning. This was a possibility of which Descartes could not have thought, but it makes a sharp separation between the world and the I impossible.

If one follows the great difficulty which even eminent scientists like Einstein had in understanding and accepting the Copenhagen interpretation... one can trace the roots... to the Cartesian partition....it will take a long time for it [this partition] to be replaced by a really different attitude toward the problem of reality.