# Quote — Paul R. Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008

> Were the Asian economies more vulnerable to financial panic in 1997 than they had been, say, five or ten years before? Yes, surely—but not because of crony capitalism, or indeed what would usually be considered bad government policies. Rather, they had become more vulnerable partly because they had opened up their financial markets—because they had, in fact, become better free-market economies, not worse. And they had also grown vulnerable because they had taken advantage of their new popularity with international lenders to run up substantial debts to the outside world. These debts intensified the feedback from loss of confidence to financial collapse and back again, making the vicious circle of crisis more intense. It wasn’t that the money was badly spent; some of it was, some of it wasn’t. It was that the new debts, unlike the old ones, were in dollars—and that turned out to be the economies’ undoing.

- Author: [Paul R. Krugman](https://www.leafyquotes.com/paul-r-krugman.md)
- Book: [The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008](https://www.leafyquotes.com/paul-r-krugman/the-return-of-depression-economics-and-the-crisis-of-2008.md)
- Source: [Wikiquote](https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Paul_Krugman#The_Return_of_Depression_Economics_and_The_Crisis_of_2008_(2009)) ([CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/))
- Quote page: https://www.leafyquotes.com/paul-r-krugman/the-return-of-depression-economics-and-the-crisis-of-2008/were-the-asian

## More from this book

> Indeed, there has long been a strand of thought that says that moderate inflation may be necessary if monetary policy is to be able to fight recessions. Still, advocates of inflation have had to contend with a deep-seated sense that stable prices are always desirable, that to promote inflation is to create perverse and dangerous incentives. This belief in the importance of price stability is not based on standard economic models—on the contrary, the usual textbook theory, when applied to Japan’s unusual circumstances, points directly to inflation as the natural solution. But conventional economic theory and conventional economic wisdom are not always the same thing—a conflict that would become increasingly apparent as one country after another found itself having to make hard choices in the face of financial crisis.

[Quote page](https://www.leafyquotes.com/paul-r-krugman/the-return-of-depression-economics-and-the-crisis-of-2008/indeed-there-has.md)

> As I’ve just noted, Greenspan warned about irrational exuberance, but he didn’t do anything about it. And in fact, the Fed chairman holds what I believe is a unique record among central bankers: he presided over not one but two enormous asset bubbles, first in stocks, then in housing.

[Quote page](https://www.leafyquotes.com/paul-r-krugman/the-return-of-depression-economics-and-the-crisis-of-2008/as-ive-just.md)

> But this warning was ignored, and there was no move to extend regulation. On the contrary, the spirit of the times—and the ideology of the George W. Bush administration—was deeply antiregulation. This attitude was symbolized by a photo-op held in 2003, in which representatives of the various agencies that play roles in bank oversight used pruning shears and a chainsaw to cut up stacks of regulations. More concretely, the Bush administration used federal power, including obscure powers of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, to block state-level efforts to impose some oversight on subprime lending.

[Quote page](https://www.leafyquotes.com/paul-r-krugman/the-return-of-depression-economics-and-the-crisis-of-2008/but-this-warning.md)