# Quote — Paul R. Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008

> Here’s what the IMF did: In Asia (as opposed to Brazil, which as I said was a sort of caricature of the Asian programs) it did not tell countries to defend the values of their currencies at all cost. But it did tell them to raise interest rates, initially to very high levels, in an attempt to persuade investors to keep their money in place. Some vociferous critics of the IMF—most notably Harvard’s Jeffrey Sachs—said that this was very much the wrong thing to do. Sachs believed, in effect, that Asian countries could and should have behaved like Australia, simply letting their currencies decline until they started to look cheap to investors, and that if they had done so, the great slump would never have happened.
>
> What the IMF said in response is that Asia is not Australia: that to let the currencies fall unchecked would have led to “hyperdevaluations,” and that the result would have been both massive financial distress (because so many businesses had debt denominated in dollars) and soaring inflation. The trouble with this rationale is, of course, that the massive financial distress happened anyway, thanks to high interest rates and the recession they helped cause. So the IMF at best avoided one vicious circle only by starting another.

- Author: [Paul R. Krugman](https://www.leafyquotes.com/paul-r-krugman.md)
- Book: [The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008](https://www.leafyquotes.com/paul-r-krugman/the-return-of-depression-economics-and-the-crisis-of-2008.md)
- Source: [Wikiquote](https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Paul_Krugman#The_Return_of_Depression_Economics_and_The_Crisis_of_2008_(2009)) ([CC BY-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/))
- Quote page: https://www.leafyquotes.com/paul-r-krugman/the-return-of-depression-economics-and-the-crisis-of-2008/heres-what-the

## More from this book

> Indeed, there has long been a strand of thought that says that moderate inflation may be necessary if monetary policy is to be able to fight recessions. Still, advocates of inflation have had to contend with a deep-seated sense that stable prices are always desirable, that to promote inflation is to create perverse and dangerous incentives. This belief in the importance of price stability is not based on standard economic models—on the contrary, the usual textbook theory, when applied to Japan’s unusual circumstances, points directly to inflation as the natural solution. But conventional economic theory and conventional economic wisdom are not always the same thing—a conflict that would become increasingly apparent as one country after another found itself having to make hard choices in the face of financial crisis.

[Quote page](https://www.leafyquotes.com/paul-r-krugman/the-return-of-depression-economics-and-the-crisis-of-2008/indeed-there-has.md)

> As I’ve just noted, Greenspan warned about irrational exuberance, but he didn’t do anything about it. And in fact, the Fed chairman holds what I believe is a unique record among central bankers: he presided over not one but two enormous asset bubbles, first in stocks, then in housing.

[Quote page](https://www.leafyquotes.com/paul-r-krugman/the-return-of-depression-economics-and-the-crisis-of-2008/as-ive-just.md)

> But this warning was ignored, and there was no move to extend regulation. On the contrary, the spirit of the times—and the ideology of the George W. Bush administration—was deeply antiregulation. This attitude was symbolized by a photo-op held in 2003, in which representatives of the various agencies that play roles in bank oversight used pruning shears and a chainsaw to cut up stacks of regulations. More concretely, the Bush administration used federal power, including obscure powers of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, to block state-level efforts to impose some oversight on subprime lending.

[Quote page](https://www.leafyquotes.com/paul-r-krugman/the-return-of-depression-economics-and-the-crisis-of-2008/but-this-warning.md)